The special operation forces (SOF) are essential to dealing with the challenges of today and tomorrow’s international security environment (says the new elected president of the NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly)

Almost 15 years after joining NATO and in the context of the new types of threats to national security, as a full member who has confirmed his will and ability to meet his obligations and commitments, I believe that there should be no more doubts about the opportunity of investing in SOF by a state with an active-defensive military strategy, such as Romania.

Now is the time to do our utmost to identify and allocate the resources needed to build, develop and maintain some strategic, quick reaction capabilities trained and equipped to conduct special reconnaissance, direct action, military assistance, and unconventional warfare, as well as complementary missions on the national or outside of the Romanian territory, under the law, independently or together with the special forces of the coalitions and alliances from which Romania is a party, as it is, in fact, defined by the law^[i].

Context

In the second part of November 2018, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly gathered in Halifax^[ii], the capital of the New Scotland province of Canada, to strengthen Atlantic engagement and set the future security priorities.

More than 270 members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly have sent a strong message of transatlantic unity and force against of several security challenges, adopting at the conclusion of their work a series of resolutions to counter the threats from Russia and elsewhere.

During the four days of debates, they discussed, among others, the role of SOF in the current security environment, as well as regional stability issues in Afghanistan, the Balkans and the Black Sea (areas of interest in which Romanian SOF are involved in the planning, organization, participation and execution of specific exercises and missions, as well).

The Assembly chose Madeleine Moon, former British rapporteur, as their new president.

Conclusions from ”NATO Special Operations Forces in Modern Security Environment” report written by the former British rapporteur Madeleine Moon

As the former British rapporteur (and current President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly) Madeleine Moon writes in the ”NATO Special Operations Force in the Modern Security Environment”^[iii] draft report, submitted to the approval of the Defense and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in October 2018, competent SOF are essential in managing the current and future challenges of the international security environment.

The conclusions of this report state that the various actors seeking to undermine Alliance cohesion will increasingly try to do so through tactics applied in the so-called "Grey zone," a concept recently used by military analysts and about which I wrote in an article titled "Special operations forces (SOF) in the modern warfare”^[iv].

Such hybrid actions aimed at exploiting the vulnerabilities linked to the economic dependence or resources of a particular state actor, related to weak and corrupt institutions, or ethnic tensions in a target state are not new actions but have been used, throughout the history of humanity, to achieve strategic goals and are lessons learned to help us prepare for future confrontations. These tactics would allow adversaries to try to avoid the consequences of a possible invocation of Article 5 by the Alliance, which would involve the use of the Alliance's superior power force in a conflict and would considerably reduce the chances of success of any opponent.

To counter the tactics used by the adversary in the ”Grey zone”, SOF can generally conduct essential missions like special reconnaissance, intelligence collection, and direct surgical direct actions, the draft report states.

In the article published on the Defense & Security Monitor website in September 2018 and mentioned above, I suggested a series of activities that SOF can plan and execute to provide an adequate response to such hybrid actions.

Results of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting, November 2018

Among the recommendations made to allied governments by members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly at the end of the last month's meeting in Halifax, Canada were:

• enhancing deterrence measures at the eastern border of NATO by improving strategic infrastructure, developing early warning systems [it includes developing specific SOF capabilities] and maintaining the readiness status of the quick reaction capabilities [it includes SOF capabilities];
• working with civil society and the private sector to protect the elections of potential foreign interference;
• taking into account the application of targeted sanctions in response to possible hybrid attacks conducted by Russia.

Parliamentarians also highlighted the need to make investments to maintain NATO's technological advantage and urged governments to redouble their efforts to meet the agreed defense spending guidelines.

Relevant NATO SOF provisions in the resolutions adopted after the Assembly meeting

As evidence of the importance given by the members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to the development of regional SOF capabilities, in addition to the very detailed report written by its chairman on the role of the SOF in the new security environment, I will mention only some of the provisions of the Resolutions no. 445 ("Updating the Responses to Russia's Hybrid Tactics") and 448 ("Reinforcing NATO's Deterrence in the East") approved at the conclusion of the last meeting.

They acknowledge that Russia's use of hybrid tactics against the Euro-Atlantic community has increased considerably in recent years and these tactics continue to pose a serious challenge to the Euro-Atlantic security, stability and unity as well as to NATO's vision of the peace of a whole and free Europe. Moreover, NATO territories and populations are confronted with conventional and hybrid threats, especially in the East of the Alliance.

Concerns were also expressed regarding the deployment of modern A2/AD (anti-access/ area denial) Russian systems along NATO's eastern flank [see the ongoing militarization of the Crimean Peninsula, for example], which could impede the Alliance's freedom of movement. The resolutions also pointed out the importance of the tailored Forward Presence (tFP) in the Black Sea Region as one of the key deterrent and defense measures to secure NATO's eastern flank.

In addition to continuing dialogue with Russia, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly urged NATO governments to implement some measures including:

• to take into account the new realities of the security environment and Russian hybrid threats when developing the new NATO Strategic Concept;
• reiterating the view that hybrid attacks can trigger the right of collective defense allies (Article 5 invocation);
• continue to invest in the development of well-prepared national SOF as the first quick response capabilities;
• enhancing co-ordinated and comprehensive co-operation with Western Balkans and Eastern Europe Allies and Partners on combating Russian hybrid warfare tactics;
• ensuring the sustainability and operability of NATO's advanced presence in the Black Sea Region, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and the NATO Response Force (NRF);
• enhancing strategic awareness by improving intelligence sharing and cooperation between national agencies and strengthening NATO's Joint Intelligence and Security Division, ["SOF need a profound understanding of both the adversary and the operational environment in which operators are to conduct specific missions."^[v]];
• investing in improving strategic infrastructure as a necessary element to combat hybrid warfare, such as improving roads, bridges, communication infrastructure, ports and airports, and enhancing the security of energy projects [it would also enhance the projection of force and freedom of movement for SOF];
• financing the contingency plans of the Alliance, including the allocation of battlefield capabilities provisioned in the Gradual Response Plan (GRP)^[vi] to provide the response to the Eastern Alliance threats [eg. the defense of Bulgaria and Romania].

Instead of a conclusion

Meanwhile, not even one week after the end of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting, as it would be a continuation of hybrid actions similar to those carried out in eastern Ukraine, and during the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, Russia captured three Ukrainian ships trying to cross over to the Azov Sea through the Kerch Strait, using patrol boats of the Coast Guard, attack aircrafts and helicopters, and even SOF, apparently, that seem to have operated outside the territorial waters to seize 24 Ukrainian seamen aboard the ships.

Almost 15 years after joining NATO and in the context of the new types of threats to national security, as a full member who has confirmed his will and ability to meet his obligations and commitments, I believe that there should be no more doubts about the opportunity of investing in SOF by a state with an active-defensive military strategy, such as Romania.

Now is the time to do our utmost to identify and allocate the resources needed to build, develop and maintain some strategic, quick reaction capabilities trained and equipped to conduct special reconnaissance, direct action, military assistance, and unconventional warfare, as well as complementary missions on the national or outside of the Romanian territory, under the law, independently or together with the special forces of the coalitions and alliances from which Romania is a party, as it is, in fact, defined by the law.

In the vicinity of Romania, there is no state, be it defensive, or even outside the Alliance that has not been operationalizing (built, trained, equipped and employed) SOF capabilities. And there is even a competition between them at the regional level, which makes them keep up with the new challenges of technological evolution and an unpredictable and constantly changing security environment, striving to be the tip of the spear in the fight against hybrid threats, against terrorism and beyond.

As a proof that, at NATO level, politicians are trying to understand the role, place and importance of such capabilities, are also this kind of bi-annual meetings held in plenary, whereby the NATO Parliamentary Assembly committees adopt political recommendations that are subject to the plenary vote of the Assembly and then, subsequently, sent to the North Atlantic Council (NAC).