Conflict escalation in Idlib: a harder test for Turkey-Russia relations

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Ankara and Moscow have backed opposing sides in the war, but, when it suited their interests, they also collaborated on establishing multiple cease-fire agreements through talks in Astana, Sochi and most recently in Moscow last month. Not the first of its kind, the ongoing escalation in Idlib has proved to be a difficult challenge for leaders on both fronts, while neither of them can afford a harsh rhetoric. Idlib has been a stronghold of the opposition and anti-government armed groups since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. In September 2018, Turkey and Russia agreed to turn Idlib into a de-escalation zone in which acts of aggression are expressly prohibited. But more than 1,800 civilians have been killed in attacks by regime and Russian forces since then, flouting both the 2018 cease-fire and a new one that started on the 12 of January. However, let us not forget that it is not only Idlib that defines the current challenge, but a whole context in which the Syrian clashes are just one integral element.

As Turkey woke up to the news of its soldiers killed and wounded in Idlib, president Erdogan was preparing for his visit to Ukraine, where he held a joint conference with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to announce a free trade agreement and increased military assistance. Visibly affected by the escalation of the conflict and by the Turkish army’s lost, president Erdogan declared in a up-front press conference just before boarding its presidential plane: “Those who are testing Turkey’s determination with this kind of treacherous attack will realize they’ve committed a big mistake. We can’t remain silent as our soldiers are martyred. We will continue to make them pay.” For those familiar with Turkish internal affairs, the funerals of soldiers martyred in the Syrian conflict have become a common element of the daily news, but the tension among the population raises as many local and international experts start to question president Erdogan’s strategy in the neighboring country and also its partnership with Russia.

In the aftermath of the clashes, both political fellows and adversaries of president Erdogan have spoken against its dangerous tango with Moscow. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli condemned the Assad regime and its attacks on Turkish troops and called on the government to reassess its relations with Russia, the regime’s main ally: "[Syria's Bashar al-] Assad is a murderer, criminal, illegal and a source of strife." Bahceli also accused Russia of not standing with Turkey on the Syria issue, saying Moscow is just as responsible for the recently martyred Turkish troops. "We must face this reality," Bahceli stressed. Russia is achieving its goals "step by step in Syria through crisis and chaos," he said. "Our sincere wish is that the government should review its relations with Russia," the MHP leader underlined in his speech. Other critics claimed such developments, though arranged prior to Erdogan’s visit, appeared intentionally designed to draw ire from Moscow. Meral Aksener, chair of the opposition nationalist IYI Party and also a strong political adversary of president Erdogan, said without evidence that providing military aid to Ukraine might have caused the clashes in Syria: “It was said that Turkey would give 200 million lira [$33.5 million] to Ukraine in aid. The same night, the night of Feb. 3, the Syrian army controlled by Russia, which is responsible for the occupation of Ukraine and Crimea, targeted Turkish soldiers. The game of chess at play here is clear: We give military aid, we become a military target." The logic behind Aksener’s statement is well-argued, although it takes a lot of courage from any political side in Turkey to speak against or criticize in any way the current government. Although not proved with clear evidence, the connection between Turkish military aid to Ukraine and the clashes in Syria might have a real background, as only the evolution of the events may prove it.

In fact, analyzed in detail and beyond the official rhetoric, Erdogan’s visit to Ukraine had a great symbolism that can only be perceived as a diplomatic answer to the role (in)directly played by Russia in the Idlib clashes. President Erdogan reiterated a previous position not to recognize Crimea as Russian territory, calling Moscow’s 2014 annexation of the peninsula "illegitimate."  As if the vocal assertion of the illegitimacy of Russia’s annexation of Crimea was not sufficient enough to attract Putin’s attention, the Turkish president also saluted the Ukrainian honor guard by saying “Slava Ukraine” (Glory to Ukraine), a slogan used by pro-Nazi Ukrainian nationalists during World War II. The current usage has anti-Russian connotations of Ukrainian nationalism for Moscow. Moreover, the visit also marked the common goals stated by both Turkey and Ukraine that include boosting bilateral trade to $10 billion by 2023 and increasing cooperation on defense financing, in which Ankara will assist Kiev with $36 million in funding to buy Turkish military equipment. The message sent by president Erdogan to Moscow, directly from Kiev, crossed Russian red lines while stating firmly: we watch our steps, but we dance by the music that you play.

Shortly after the controversial visit to Ukraine, the Turkish president reached out to his Russian counterpart to sort out differences on Syria and show that their partnership and cooperation endures. Although well-aware of Russia’s role in the latest military offensive in Idlib that put Turkey’s military presence in jeopardy, president Erdogan was careful enough to disassociate President Bashar al-Assad’s regime from Moscow and spoke as if it was just the Syrian government forces violating the principles agreed between Turkey and Russia in Sochi in September 2018. In this way, the subtle line given to the recent events portrayed the Syrian regime’s actions as a betrayal for both Ankara and Moscow. Furthermore, president Erdogan emphasized that Turkey should not get into a serious conflict or a serious confrontation with Russia at this stage, as both countries are committed to have very serious common initiatives. An easily predictable move, the Turkish step towards Moscow proved once again that Erdogan cannot afford to directly confront president Vladimir Putin, although the conflicting interests and visions regarding the region together with increasing level of frustration on both sides are becoming more and more visible in the background, hidden just like a Pandora’s box never to be opened.

President Erdogan is well-known for his impulsiveness and sharp reactions to his adversaries, but more than ever before, the way he managed the developing context in the first weeks of February proves elegant diplomacy, spiced with some Ottoman vengeance. Before his speech upon his return to Ankara and in contradiction, for the ones who are not familiar with Turkey-Russia relation, to the statements made the previous day, the Turkish president emphasized the importance of Turkey’s multifaceted relationship with Russia. He underlined Turkey’s energy dependence on Russia as well as the geopolitical value of their exclusive relationship and he made it through a Turkish proverb that describes Turkey’s position in the best way possible: “Whoever gets up in rage sits down with a loss.” On the other hand, faced with journalists’ questions, president Erdogan didn’t hide his disappointment regarding the Russian position, sending a strong message by blaming the “massacre” on the Syrian-Russian couple who intentionally “targeted the civilian population”.

In response to president Erdogan’s remarks, the Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement on the situation in Idlib, stressing Russia’s commitment to cooperation with Turkey: “We reaffirm our commitment to the agreements and mutual understandings reached within the Astana format, providing for the need to fight terrorist groups in Syria with respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.” The Russian statement is far from the Turkish expectations, as it clearly endorses the Syrian government forces’ offensive in Idlib, which is proceeding to the detriment of Turkey’s military presence, with tacit criticism of the Turkish posture in Idlib.

The reaction of both sides has not proved efficient enough, as the situation in Idlib continued to escalate and seriously worsened around the 10^th of February. More casualties have been announced following last week's large-scale Turkish military deployment in the region to prevent the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from further advancing. A new attack by the Syrian army led to the death of five more Turkish troops. In retaliation, the Turkish Ministry of Defense reported it had hit 115 Syrian targets and “neutralized” 101 Syrian military personnel. The crisis resembles a maleficent computer game where each side tries to inflict as much damage as possible on the adversary. Unfortunately, it is human lives that are at the center of this bloody conflict, and none of the leaders, disregard their religious or ethical beliefs, seem to acknowledge this reality. 

The Russian delegation returned to Turkey on Monday morning after the first meeting between Russian and Turkish negotiators in Ankara on Saturday provided no solution to the crisis. The situation worsens as we speak, while Russia is not willing to accept and support Ankara’s demands for a pullout by the Syrian forces beyond the demarcation line defined by the 2018 Sochi memorandum. Moscow is somehow caught between two “partners of convenience” and cannot demand that Damascus fulfill these stipulations while Assad’s troops continue to advance despite the Turkish military deployment. Russia does not fancy taking any risk towards its bilateral relations with Syria and they would rather sacrifice their “Ottoman ally” and not refuse support for Assad's troops should the Turkish forces and opposition units attempt to go on the offensive and push the Syrian army beyond the borders of the Idlib de-escalation zone.

Although carefully managing the situation, Ankara understand the dynamics and remembers that those are the times when being a powerful, although sometimes contested, NATO member proves an advantage. Calling for NATO’s support in the region, Turkey is currently walking on a very loose string and is facing the threat of a direct military clash with Russia. Moscow also did not open the airspace over Idlib for the Turkish Air Force, reducing the Turkish military operation's likelihood of success even if Moscow avoids direct military involvement in the fight.

Ankara's claims to Moscow may also be read as intentionally raising the stakes for the sake of further bargaining. Doing so may enable Moscow to save face in Damascus by demonstrating perseverance in upholding Syrian interests in negotiations with Turkey should a new agreement on Idlib be made that embraces new realities on the ground.

Beyond the egocentric motivations and the threats for revenge, this may prove the right time for Turkey to reassess its position in Syria and also its “partnership” with Russia. Although a powerful response to the recent attacks, targeted military deployment in Idlib may not prove beneficial in the long run. Instead, it may be more beneficial to focus on other territories that have not been seized by the Syrian regime and that can represent the new Turkish security zone and can also provide a safe terrain for the Turkish army to regain its strength. Losing 13 soldiers in the Syrian attacks put a greater pressure on the Turkish troops and also on president Erdogan who needs to consider well in advance its following steps. The Syrian conflict has long proved to have a great impact on the Turkish internal politics and any weak decision from the Turkish president may not only threaten Turkey’s position in the region, but also his legitimacy as a leader. Although well-motivated, Turkey’s persistence in demanding the Syrian army’s withdrawal beyond the line set by the Sochi accords with no document signed by the parties could only toughen the Russian position, with Moscow being more attracted to denouncing the “Turkish ally”. This can, as a result lead to a new cold war, this time between Russia and Turkey, developing in the shadow of a fuming Idlib. This will only strengthen the hand of the Syrian regime who has proved to be the most stubborn among all the Arab regimes, as it still holds on to the power, despite the ten-year conflict and the millions of lives affected.