Turkey-Russia-Iran relations beyond the Syrian war: a Pandora box at the bottom of the Bermuda Triangle
Andreea Stoian KaradeliLast week the world witnessed one more game played at the expense of the Syrian civilians that lost their homes and families in the ongoing war. Together with them, dozens of Turkish soldiers were martyred in Idlib in an attack described by the Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar as “deliberate, despite warnings”. Meanwhile, Assad’s main ally – Russia - claimed that the location of the Turkish troops was not known as they were found “in the battle formations of terrorist groups.” Iran, troubled with its internal issues caused by the Corona virus, showed a rather neutral reaction, stressing the need to immediately “manage and calm the current tense situation.” The Iranian Foreign Ministry also called for holding a new Iranian-Russian-Turkish summit within the framework of the Astana process. But this is just the surface of a Bermuda Triangle whose bottom hides a never-to-be-opened Pandora box, leaving many to wonder what it is really happening between Turkey, Russia and Iran beyond the Syrian context.
Since the targeting of a Turkish Commando Unit in Syria’s Idlib province, leading to the martyrdom of 36 soldiers, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have been conducting an operation with locally produced armed drones against the Damascus regime and its allies. So far, the retaliation led to the death of several Iran-backed forces in Syria’s northwest, along with the Syrian soldiers. Turkish forces neutralized a number of 31 Shiite militias including one Iranian national, 9 Hezbollah militias and 21 from the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun brigades - which consist of Afghan and Pakistani Shiite forces supported by the Islamic Republic. Apparently diplomatic in its call for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, Iran also felt targeted and was uncomfortable with Russia’s lack of reaction to Turkey’s retaliation. As a result, it issued a direct warning to Ankara through the Islamic Republic’s “advisory centre in northern Syria”, a board that was never know before. The “centre” issued a threatening statement: if the retaliatory attacks continue, Turkish soldiers in Syria are “within firing range” of the Iranian forces, therefore the Turkish military are asked “to act wisely” so as not to trigger a move from the Iranian side.
While Russia is already well-known as a strong player in the Syrian game, Iran has proved to be a backstage ally of the Syrian regime, for the sake of its own interests. Iran’s direct involvement in Syria has never been as openly declared as it happened last week when the message sent to Turkey was clear enough to be understood by all parties involved: Iran has its own interests and red lines for the Syria and especially for its northwest region. According to the Iranian advisory centre, forces from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) along with Hezbollah and other “resistance” forces have been involved in securing the Syrian government’s control over the strategic M5 highway that connects Damascus with Aleppo. This translates into the same forces cooperating with the Syrian army in the face of the “armed forces supported by the Turkish military,” who wanted to retake the highway. Therefore, the situation proves that guaranteeing the Assad government’s control over the M5 highway is one of Iran’s main priorities in that area.
Nevertheless, Idlib has a great strategic importance for all the sides involved in war, which makes it the current epicentre of the Turkey-Russia-Iran Bermuda Triangle. First of all, Idlib is the last main stronghold of the rebel and jihadist groups that have been trying to overthrow President Assad since 2011. Strategically important to the Syrian regime, the province borders Turkey to the north and straddles highways running south from the city of Aleppo to the capital Damascus, and west to the Mediterranean city of Latakia. Because of the war, Idlib received an influx of displaced people, reaching a population of almost three million, among which one million are children. The “liberation” of Idlib, as it is aimed by the Syrian regime, has all the premises to end in another wave of refugees to the closest neighbour – Turkey. Just at its border, Idlib is extremely important for Ankara, both as a matter of national security – protection of its land border – and as a preventive measure against a new heavy migration wave. Moreover, Turkey's stepping back in Idlib could have the consequence of encouraging Iran and Russia to move forward into and endangering not only Idlib but other regions now being secured thanks to Turkey's Operation Peace Spring. Strategically, the fate of Idlib is not crucial for Russia. But it is important that no danger is posed to the Russian base in Latakia. Equally important to Russia is to maintain the control in the region and to hold a balance between Turkey and Syria. For Iran and its proxies in Syria, Idlib became as important as it is for the side it supports – the regime. A cluster of interests and personal ego is developing itself around a province that has already witnessed very hard times in what has been described as “humanitarian failure”.
The Russia-Turkey meeting: its symbolism and outcome
On the morning of March 5th, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his officials (the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Defence and the Head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization) travelled to Moscow to meet the Russian President Vladimir Putin, in the aftermath of the conflict escalation in Idlib. A cease-fire was the solution both sides had in mind as the main outcome of the meeting, but the process and details of this cease-fire were to become the real show of power, interest, ego and context manipulation. Although President Erdogan had heavy guests in Istanbul that day, he agreed to fly to Russia to meet his President Putin. For some, this represented a proof of a week hand in Turkish bilateral relations with Russia, for others, it reflected how pressing the situation had become and how important and urgent was for the Turkish side to find a solution. Many had rushed into criticizing the Turkish rush and stated that president Erdogan demonstrated he needed Putin more than the Russian president needed him. Personally, I believe that the Turkish president proved that he is able to pay any price when it comes to defending the Turkish national interest, even if that price might be sacrificing its personal ego.
Still, the meeting in Russia was marked with uncomfortable symbolism to the Turks. Starting with the protocol and the body language of the two presidents as Vladimir Putin stood up and made a coarse gesture to call members of the Turkish delegation for a handshake, showing like he is now ready to give them his attention. The body language was not the only one that hold valuable, though heavy, symbolism. The whole set-up of the meeting looked as if it was directed from a Russian history book. Videos show the Turkish delegation standing under an imposing statue of Catherine the Great, the Russian empress who annexed Crimea from Ottoman Turkey in 1783 and defeated the Ottomans several times in the Russo-Turkish wars in 1768-74 and 1787-1792. As if this was not enough to send a strong message to the ones wise enough to catch it, President Putin invited President Erdogan to sit next to him, under a bronze sculpture of Russian soldiers of the fateful Russian-Turkish War that ended in Ottoman Turkey’s defeat in 1878. The past of the Turkish-Russian relations does not provide a strong platform for collaboration between the two great powers and reminding the bitter times does not do any good to either sides. However, it feeds the Russian ego and gives it a contextual advantage, for the moment.
Although a success on the short-term for conflict de-escalation, the outcome of the 5th of March meeting resembled mostly a Syrian-Russian victory at a very dangerous time for all the sides involved in the crisis. From the very first words of the Russian president – the introductory speech of the welcoming press conference hold before the meeting – he drew a balance between the lives of the Turkish martyrs and the deaths among the Syrian regime’s forces in the Turkish retaliation. Although the Russians hardly leave space to show vulnerabilities, especially when it is in their own terrain, this introductory speech reflects how difficult the mediator position is, notably when you lack objectivity. Russia does not want to sacrifice the current bilateral relations with Turkey, that go beyond the Syrian war – as proven by the presence of the Turkish Minister of Economy, but, at the same time, it has to protect its own position and interests through the support provided to the Syrian regime.
“Soci 2.0” – the outcome of the March 5th meeting between Russia and Turkey – is, officially, an “additional protocol" to the Sochi memorandum of understanding of Sept. 17, 2018. The main three elements agreed by both sides are: to cease all military actions along the line of contact in the Idlib de-escalation area starting from 12:01 a.m. March 6th, the establishment of a security corridor of 6 kilometres deep to the north and 6 kilometres deep to the south of the M4 highway, and the creation of a joint Turkish-Russian patrolling along the M4 highway from the settlement of Trumba to the settlement of Ain al-Havr starting with March 15th. Specific parameters for the functioning of the security corridor will be agreed upon between the Defense Ministries of the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation within seven days. As the world is waiting to see how this cease-fire struggles to last, the Russian delegation is expected in Turkey this week to discuss further details. It is important to see if the talks will also touch on the M5 highway, a key element for all sides that was not mentioned after the meeting on March 5th.
Although hardly coping with its internal issues, Iran follows with great interest the developments between Russia and Turkey, and is ready to interfere at any time, if the conditions do not suit its own interests. Bearing in mind all the proxies found in the region and the multitude of variables that can damage the hardly achieved cease-fire, Russia and Turkey are now stepping on moving sands, to say the least. All sides need to be careful when they make the next move as any mistake can now have a heavy price.
What next for the Bermuda Triangle?
In Syria, three former empires - Czarist/Soviet, Ottoman and Persian – are currently competing for power and control. Similar to each other in many ways, mostly in terms of main aims, the three current regional powers have found it convenient to collaborate in some matters. But, in most ways the three presidents and their national interests, doubled by their strong egos are competing in a regional context that is already a disaster on all levels: humanitarian, geo-strategic, political, social, economic, cultural and so on. While the global power – the US - proved wise enough to step back, it is easy to pull yourself out when it is not your border at stake. Therefore, this is not an option for Turkey, Russia and Iran. Time will show how wise the three sides are, but it is in their hands where the future of millions of damaged lives is to be found.
