The future of the Foreign Terrorist Fighter phenomenon: where, how, when?

The “foreign fighter” has had its bright times of history when it was treated as a positive element, while the war returnees used to be heroes for both the communities that they joined and to the people back home. The emergence of Daesh in Syria and Iraq triggered a different and more dangerous phase of the "foreign fighter" phenomenon which has expanded on a much larger scale. As a result, the United Nations Security Council, at Turkey's proposal, added the title of "terrorists" to the name "foreign fighters" and declared them illegitimate (UN, Resolution 2178 / 25.09.2014). Thus, the term "foreign fighter" became "foreign terrorist fighter" and the legal framework is represented by Resolution 2178 of 24 September 2014, which defines them accordingly:

"[...] persons moving to another state than their state of residence or nationality for the purpose of committing, planning, preparing or participating in acts of terrorism or in providing or receiving terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict ... "(UN Security Council, Resolution 2178 / 25.09.2012)

The first of its kind to regulate the dangerous phenomenon, the UN Resolution 2178 represented a foundation for the future fight against those individuals and, at the same time, warned Member States of the threat and urged them to take the necessary measures to prevent the actions of these foreign terrorist fighters (FTF), as follows:

- “to prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by means of strict border control and control of the issuing of identity documents and travel documents, as well as by measures to prevent counterfeiting, falsification or fraudulent use of identity documents and security documents. travel",

- “to intensify and accelerate, through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms, the exchange of operational information on the actions or transit of terrorists or terrorist groups, including foreign terrorist fighters, in particular in relation to their states of residence or states whose citizenship I own, "

- “to cooperate in the efforts to combat the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including by preventing the radicalization of people and recruiting foreign terrorist fighters, including children, by preventing foreign terrorist fighters from crossing the border, by withdrawing and stopping financial support. aliens, as well as through the beginning and conduct of criminal prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies. in order to repatriate foreign terrorist fighters " (UN Security Council, Resolution 2178 / 25.09.2012).

Together with the UN Resolution 2178, the terrorist attacks that took place in Western Europe and were connected to terrorists who travelled to Syria or/and Iraq before the attacks, got broad public attention and became a popular topic of the media as well as the political discourse. Unfortunately, this subject is just a reflection of a broader and more complex background which has proved to feed from the lack a neutral and balanced approach, and it is rather abused for attention-seeking and popularity-increasing purposes. The way in which the subject and the definition of the foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) is approached in relation to the displacement in the conflict zones or to the manifestation of the intention to commit a terrorist act is a result and a clear reflection of the level of threat that this phenomenon implies to national and international security. Taking into account the complexity, the high degree of difficulty and the uncertainty of the success of the process of de-radicalization for these individuals and understanding the "contagious" effect that they can manifest in the spread of violence at international level, regardless of the territorial borders, the third generation of fighters - foreign terrorist fighters - presents a high level of threat, which justifies the content of UN Resolution 2178.

For the sake of providing a broader picture of the situation, until 2017 approximately 42,900 foreign fighters from 120 countries travelled to Syria and Iraq to join Daesh from whom more than 5,000 individuals were from the EU states. Since 2013, several terrorist attacks motivated by Daesh were committed in several countries, mainly in France, Belgium, Germany and United Kingdom. In fact, the countries that had the highest number of foreign terrorist fighters also became the main targets of the terrorist attacks. This fact strengthened a discourse that mainly focused on the salafi-jihadi nature of the issue. Meanwhile, the conflict in Ukraine also emerged and, although not mediatized, lured a large number of foreign terrorist fighters. However, this aspect of the phenomenon was given much less attention for several reasons. On the one hand, large majority of foreign fighters in Ukraine is of Russian origin, and it is often hard to define whether they are volunteers or member of the official Russian forces (although denied by Moscow). Another reason for the lower level attention is that these fighters and returnees did not commit such terrorist attacks like the jihadists. But this does not mean that they do not represent a threat to their countries of origin or to a future destination.

As the term "foreign fighter" began to be used mainly with the salafi-jihadi connotation, the far right has also become another important source of "foreign terrorist fighters", in two separate contexts: the exodus to Kurdish organizations in Syria and the conflict in Ukraine. While for the Syrian war, it is hard to find valid numbers of the FTFs that joined Kurdish groups, motivated by the extremist far right ideology, according to the information gathered and analyzed by Arkadiusz Legiec, an analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, between 2014-2019, about 17,000 foreign terrorist fighters crossed the borders of Ukraine. Comparing the number with the approximately 40,000 foreign terrorist fighters in Syria, but also with the previous waves of foreign terrorist fighters, we can observe and understand the magnitude of the phenomenon in the Ukrainian context. The EU states face more than 5,000 terrorist fighters in Syria and around 2,000 in Ukraine. Both values ​​are worrying, and the long-term effect of this exodus is far from expected or predicted. Previous conflicts did not attract large numbers of Western foreign fighters. As a result, there were simply fewer Western foreign fighter returnees. As one French official stated, the high numbers of foreign fighters simply make returnee attacks in home countries “a statistical certainty” (Byman&Shapiro, 2014). Rob Wainwright, former head of Europol, shared a similar opinion. He warned: “Europe is currently facing the highest terror threat in more than a decade… we can expect ISIL or other religious groups to stage an attack somewhere in Europe with the aim of achieving mass casualties among the civilian population.” Vladimir Voronkov, UN Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, summarized the threat: “Returning foreign terrorist fighters pose an enormous challenge with no easy solution.”

The threat posed by "foreign terrorist fighters" has increased the aftermath of the “Caliphate”, even if the Daesh terrorist organization lost the territory. The victory of the international community is overshadowed by the uncertainty about how the situation of foreign terrorist fighters, their women and children will be resolved in the context of the ongoing war in Syria. Currently, a large number of foreign fighters are in hold in improvised prisons under the control of Kurdish forces in northern Syria. Beside them, there are hundreds of women with their children, whose states of origin do not rush to repatriate them. After 2017, one can observe an upward trend of returns, caused either by the breaking of the utopia of the "Caliphate" or by the withdrawal of the organization's strategy to locate members in key points at international level. Given the role played by foreign terrorist Daesh fighters in the first wave of terrorist attacks in Western Europe, this upward trend in returns should be a cause for concern for European states and at the same time an incentive for developing a long-term strategy for preventing terrorist activity led by these individuals.

Abdelhamid Abaaoud became the epitome of a foreign fighter returnee from Syria and Iraq whom Western security services so feared. He represented a larger group of individuals who were willing to travel back to their home countries with plans to attack. Among them was Mehdi Nemmouche, who carried out the Jewish Museum shooting in Brussels. Ayoub El Khazzani returned to Europe to mount an attack on the Thalys train. Najim Laachraoui and Mohamed Abrini came back to plot terrorist attacks in Brussels. While at first glance, these individuals seemed to be lone wolves, closer investigations revealed that they were all connected to the foreign fighter returnee networks that Abaaoud was able to build. Terrorist attacks successfully carried out by these individuals demonstrated that returnees from Syria and Iraq were not always coming back with peaceful intentions.

Therefore, in the context of the European Union, the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters in Syria has proved to be a time bomb, for the following reasons: they were behind the terrorist attacks in the European states after 2014, the countries with an increased number of fighters foreign terrorists were targeted for a larger number of attacks which, in their turn, were much better organized, using a complex modus-operandi. As such, the security of our states today depends, to a large extent, on how we will handle the crisis represented by this phenomenon, on three main sides: the terrorist fighters themselves, the Daesh women - often more radicalized than their husbands, and , more important than anything, Daesh children. The few states in the European Union that had the courage to repatriate a small number of the last two categories, were hit by the legal problem and chose to separate children from their mothers, who faced a trial and were sent to prison. France is one of the countries promoting this solution, unfortunately creating even more serious problems in the long run. Daesh children come from Syria and Iraq with the trauma of indescribable violence and radical ideology, many of them experiencing direct involvement in acts of terror. Separating those children from the only person who inspires them trusts, will only cause a new trauma and transform them into future enemies, throwing them indirectly into the arms of the same ideology.

Essentially, there are three international institutional forums fighting to combat the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters within Daesh and, implicitly, against Daesh: the Anti-Daesh Coalition, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), and the UN Committee on Combating Terrorism (UN CTC). The anti-Daesh coalition is taking direct action against the terrorist organization in the territory, such as bombing key points for the organization and conducting attacks on Daesh militants. The Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) creates a platform to decide on the strategies underlying current threats and pave the way for international cooperation. The UN Committee to Combat Terrorism (UN CTC) aims to establish internationally harmonized national regulations.

To tackle the issue of foreign fighter return, Western governments have also devised a number of approaches. Several countries have implicitly supported elimination of foreign fighters on the battlefield to physically prevent their return. Thus, the United States and UK have operated with unofficial “shoot-to-kill” lists. Other countries have attempted to prevent the return of foreign fighters by revoking their citizenship. This approach has been highly controversial. It has either displaced the problem to other governments or turned individuals into stateless persons. Further, the vast majority of Western countries have prosecuted returning foreign fighters. However, imprisoning returnees has not been without its own peril. Prison-based radicalization has been on the rise in the West, which poses risks of further radicalization of returnees while in prison. In addition, most returnees have received short prison sentences, meaning they are either already out of prison or will be released in the next couple of years. Governments need to pay special attention to after-prison programs for such individuals. Further, given the risks of imprisonment, governments should rely on rigorous individual assessment protocols which would allow to determine whether an individual has to go to prison or might have a better chance to reform through a non-custodial sentence. Indiscriminate imprisonment of foreign fighter returnees might create more security problems in the long run, while alternative punishments can provide a better way for returnees to rehabilitate and reintegrate back into the society.

If dealing with returnees has been a complicated endeavor, certain returnee categories require even more focused attention. Traditionally, Western governments have approached foreign fighter women and children as victims of terrorists. However, this position oversimplifies their roles. Daesh has changed its stance on women and has gradually shifted away from advocating for supportive domestic roles for its female members toward training and preparing women to be terrorists and combatants. Similarly, Daesh has trained and prepared children to become the next

generation of fighters. It desensitized them to violence from an early age and indoctrinated them with the harshest version of extremist ideologies. Daesh children have appeared on video executing prisoners and participating in other acts of violence. So far, female and child returnees from Syria and Iraq have not staged successful terrorist attacks in the West. However, female and underage Daesh sympathizers have. One can easily see how Daesh could exploit its female and child members to dispatch them as terrorists to their home countries. Consequently, governments should pay special attention to women and children returning from Syria and Iraq, providing them with complex assistance they require. At the same time, authorities should not discard the threats women and children might pose and should assess them individually to estimate potential risks they pose.

The conceptualization of the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) is an ongoing process, and the international community is trying to understand the phenomenon and to act accordingly. Therefore, the UN GCTF and CTC efforts also include legislative projects, such as defining and regulating international travel standards. At the same time, at the international level, states must work together to develop a warning system regarding terrorist activity, especially in the case of foreign terrorist fighters. This system can be part of a long-term strategy, developed by counter-terrorism commissions that is highlighted by multiculturalism, multidisciplinary and the ability to understand the contexts in which such phenomena evolve. It is absolutely necessary for researchers in fields such as national security, counterterrorism, statistics, psychology, sociology, international communication to be part of these teams because the experience of the counterterrorism practitioner is no longer sufficient in the fight against extremism.

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from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy

Paper 34 (2014): 10.

Robert Munks, Matt Henman, and Alexia Ash, “Islamic State Plans to Attack European

Cities,” Jane’s, February 29, 2016.

“Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters Pose ‘Enormous Challenge with no Easy Solution,’

Security Council Told,” UN News, November 29, 2017, https://news.un.org/en/

story/2017/11/637592-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-pose-enormous-challenge-noeasy-

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