Republic of Moldova. 2020 outlook

In the meantime, social tensions will increase, because society does not accept an economic regress, the return to an autarchic and bootleg economy, and an unclear policy, somehow autocratic, nor the foreign direction towards a satellite stance of a country like Russia, which does not offer a thing, not even a political and economic viable model.

With Igor Dodon promoting a “piece by piece Kozak plan”, starting with “recognized neutrality”, Russia will seek RM’s control without giving anything in return[1], being only interested in strengthening its advanced base for its troops, enlarged from Transnistria to the entire RM, not just satellite’s subvention, although it will stimulate such thing. The economic support must be provided by EU, US and Romania. Therefore, Dodon will continue his “pro-European parody”, as the Western funding is so necessary for a state bankrupted by its own elite.

Similar to previous developments, when Igor Dodon will cross the “red line” and will not have any alternative, as he is a simple doer, the society and/or elite will take him down, regardless of how much Russia will try to help him. Therefore, we will be witnessing many secret agreements implemented by stealth. However, Igor Dodon himself will try to keep things moderated, pretending it is all because of “sovereigntists”. The West already has the whole picture, but they are waiting, listless, after begin fooled for so many times, for an internal reaction to end this all.

RM, the “troubled problem”, may become geopolitically irrelevant, therefore less interesting, in 2020, hence Russia’s interest in recovering it or West’s in helping it will disappear. The drama of a state bankrupted by its own elite will get even bigger when no power pole will be interested in supporting it. If Ukraine gets to peace in Donbass without losing much of its sovereignty, and Romania will advance on the Western path it has already chose, then RM, even captured by Russia, will no longer be but an island between two democratic states, making Moscow only able to threaten them, but not destabilize. Still, Romania will continue to be interested in helping its RM citizens, just like Russia will do with its own.

Leaders’ political moves are quite predictable. They will fake the juridical and political reform, in fact going back to Plahotniuc’s moves, or even worse, all state’s institutions will get to be controlled by Igor Dodon. PSRM’s propaganda will cover this restoration, and social programs, in fact, voters’ bribery, will fake an economic development. Leadership’s maneuvers of saying something and doing the opposite, only to fool EU and US and keep the funding and the political support, are predictable but also interesting to watch.

Leadership’s main issue is not the ACUM opposition, but the future reports of Igor Dodon and PSRM with PDM. Both parties have similar policies internally, yet different ones on foreign plans. Meanwhile PSRM is pro-Russian by definition, PDM is pretending to be pro-European, though it is not. The power foundation of these two parties is the same, part of the “state pyramid”[2] and “business network”[3], the “sovereigntist” one, is on PDM’s side, and the other part is actually the foundation of the other populist party, PSRM. Igor Dodon must avoid bothering PDM’s interests, especially when promoting Russia’s interests, because he is risking losing the parliamentary support for “his government”. Furthermore, without PDM’s support, Igor Dodon will find it difficult to get a second presidential mandate. The connections between these two parties will influence RM’s political development, counterbalancing Russia’s interests promoted by Dodon. When Dodon’s two “dependencies” will get to a serious contradiction, the de facto alliance between PSRM and PDM will be destroyed. Until that happens, this complicity will postpone Russia’s plans. Dodon could tell Kremlin that his actions and delays are the result of limits imposed by sharing power with PDM.  

In terms of economy, they will go back to classical plans, hence reduce transparency. This is why they had estranged FMI and got an investment fund from Russia.

RM will still be militarily irrelevant, therefore Russia does not need to use military pressures to reach its political goals. This does not mean that RM will not make concessions to Russia[4]. Given these circumstances, when RM is centering on Russia, the problem is keeping the Western funding for the National Army.

The “5+2” format negotiations will reduce the tensions and get Tiraspol out of isolation, without making any concessions. This will also be the place to implement a new “piece by piece Kozak Memorandum”, as long as the forced implementation did not work in 2005, nor in 2019. Time will prove us how much are EU and Germany willing to concede to Russia. Although there is no openness to compromise, they do not want to get to larger issues, like a “Transnistrialisation” RM, to be fully controlled by Russia, and Kremlin is not ready to cool down its goal.

Romania will be more contained in terms of its relations with RM, but not its citizens in that state. The unification of these states, the great scarecrow promoted by RM’s political elite, has turned dangerous… for Romania, due to national security reasons. Hence, this elite, with Igor Dodon in command, can show its responsibility on the state it is representing, though also the state it bankrupted and it is about to hand to Russia.