Montenegro – promises, hopes, but also uncertainties

After 30 years, Montenegro has a new parliamentary majority

In the last 30 years, Milo Bukanovic proved to be skilled when it came to running the political scene in Montenegro. At the end of the 90’s, when he became prime-minister, he was close to the former leader of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, but, in the last years, he distanced more and more from Belgrade and promoted an independency policy, running the 2006 referendum, which was the foundation of Montenegro’s separation from Serbia. His country started, then, the process for the European and Euro-Atlantic integration, starting the accession negotiations to EU, in 2012, then accessing NATO, in 2017.

The recent parliamentary elections (August 30^th) had an unprecedented result and, for many, unexpected as well, which might prove to be extremely important for the future political, economic, social and military situation in the Western Balkans. The last electoral process developed in Montenegro could be defined as one marked by a strong competition, in a highly polarized environment of topics such as religious and ethical identity.

The “Democratic Socialists Party of Montenegro” (DSP) of the Montenegrin president won 30 of the 81 parliamentary positions, according to the final results published by the Public Electoral Commission and will be able to control up to 40 parliamentary positions, supported by his small traditional allies. However, the number of votes will not be enough for the party to have a parliamentary majority.

At the same time, three of opposition’s coalition, with divergent political platforms won 41 of the 81 positions in the parliament – “For Montenegro’s future“ (ZBCG/leader Zdravko Krivokapic) got 27 positions, “Peace is our nation” (MNN/leader Aleksa Becic) got 10 places, meanwhile “United Reform Action” (URA/LEADER Dritan Abazovic[1]) got 4 positions.

Although DSP got the biggest number of votes, the three opposition coalitions which signed an alliance agreement, on September 9^th, have the majority and the establishment of a new government is expected. According to the agreed deal, signed in front of the mass-media by the three political groups, the new government they are about to create will “responsibly implement all the international regulations assumed by the state, will consolidate and improve cooperation with NATO and… will implement all the necessary reforms for the full accession of Montenegro to EU”.

Also, the three political groups signed a guarantee that the new government will not start any procedure to change the national flag, the tails or the hymn, that is following the current Constitution of Montenegro. Furthermore, it was guaranteed that there will be no political revenge, that the new government will adopt all the laws according to the European standards, to get the integration in the EU as soon as possible, that it will quickly and dedicatedly implement all the reforms related to the European integration of the country, that will depoliticize the main public institutions to provide a fight lacking compromises against corruption and criminal acts and that the new government will follow all the international obligations, including the country’s membership to NATO and the abandonment of all initiatives to change the position of recognition of Kosovo’s independence, which was previously supported by some members of the new parliamentary majority (for example, the Democratic Front, mainly component of the new ZBCG coalition).

Z. Krivokapic underlined that the new government is getting ready for the worst scenarios in terms of economy. He stated that Montenegro will not be controlled by Serbia or Russia, but his government will have better diplomatic relations with both countries, also calling Montenegro’s accession to EU the main priority of the new government coalition. The leaders of the political groups that will be part of the new government will allow the minority parties to join the governing, regardless if they have or not a parliamentary status. It was underlined also that the new government will be established and officially installed until the end of October, except if the process of taking over the power will be stopped by president Milo Dukanovic.

The political scientist Florian Bieber[2] described the elections’ results as a “good news for democracy”, and Josep Borell, the High EU Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Oliver Varhelyi, the European commissary for neighborhood and enlargement have stated that “they are looking forward for the establishment of a new parliament and the establishment of a new government, which will continue Montenegro’s path towards EU”. Also, the European People’s Party women’s president, Doris Pack, has stated that she supported the new parliamentary majority in Montenegro, criticizing the DPS regime, who is “out of the scene” for its tactics and “socialist propaganda”, calling on the public opinion and the Western mass-media to not fall in the propaganda’s trap, underlining that the EU integration is, indeed, the main objective of the new government, after regime’s change.

The possible causes of the political power change in Montenegro

The DPS’s electoral defeat and that of its leader, the Montenegrin president, M. Dukanovic, after 30 years of governing, was the consequence of many factors.

In the international analysis environments and among the population in Montenegro, people says that the dynamic of the internal order is marked by an endemic corruption, nepotism, threat and consequences specific to the increasing organized crime, prolonged economic crisis, the dole’s increase, the poverty’s increase, as well as the increasing number of young generations seeking a better future in Western Europe and North America.

Given these circumstances, one might say that, after leading the country for more than three decades, M. Dukanovic could offer the hope of better developments regarding the increase of the living standards and the prosperity of all citizens. It seems it was just a matter of time the emergence of the moment when the increasing frustration of a great part of the people on the autocratic governing of Dukanovic to finally find its political voice able to influence the electorate and win the number of votes necessary to establish a new parliamentary majority.

These developments only happen four years after the country faced a coup d’état attempt, supposedly supported by Russia and Serbia, to prevent Montenegro’s accession to NATO. The DPS government at that time managed to combat it and continued the integration process of Montenegro in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Thus, there are many concerns now that the elections’ results will bring to power a pro-Russian, anti-Western coalition, which will threaten country’s stabilization, the ethnical peace, the European integration and independency.

Clearly, the pro-Serbians and pro-Russians managed to mobilize their electorate through nationalist and ethnical feelings. The positions in Podgorica’s Parliament that they managed to get on August 30^th were seen as a victory by great part of the Serbian community in the country, which represents almost 30% of the populations and it was celebrated by the Serbians in Serbia, but also by the ones in Srpska Republic, an entity led by Serbians in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

In the same context, Muslim minorities in Montenegro, about 20% of the population, felt threatened, an eloquent example of this being that in the city of Pljevlja, the Islamic community building was attacked and the Bosnian inhabitants were verbally and physically assaulted.  In this context, it can be added that they have reported attacks on Muslims in other cities as well.

It can be said that the decisive moment of weakening the internal situation and increasing political unpredictability was caused by the insistence on the adoption of a controversial and rather problematic law normalizing the freedom of religious expression in Montenegro, thus initiating a conflict against an old ally of the Montenegrin President, the metropolitan Amfilohije Radovic of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) in Montenegro. What followed was a series of SPC-led protests, associated with the radicalization of identity policy and an increase in Serbian and Montenegrin ethnic nationalism. Moreover, it was not taken into account that a decisive confusion was generated regarding the effect that could be caused for a significant segment of the DPS's own electoral base, but which regularly participates in religious services and personally worships the  Metropolitan R. Amfilohije. Looking at the possible effects that could have been produced, it seems that M.Đukanović seemed convinced that he could personally take advantage of this political point of view, a Montenegrin official believing that their loyalty as traditional voters for DPS will be stronger than loyalty to their church and Metropolitan R. Amfilohije.

While maintaining a pro-Western foreign policy, which led to Western support, M. Đukanović's DPS government was increasingly shaken by corruption scandals and growing fears of authoritarianism. As public outrage over large-scale corruption escalated, popular anti-government protests erupted in 2019. Then M.Đukanović began promoting a bill on freedom of religion and legal status in religious communities. The law, which sought to establish the autocephaly of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which split from the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1993, was passed in December 2019, disturbing the country's Serbian community. Government critics have doubted the reasons behind adopting the law, claiming that M. Đukanović has diverted attention from scandals on corruption and authoritarianism and ethnic play, as do other leaders in the Western Balkans. The adoption of the law had the expected effect, diverting attention from corruption scandals, by inciting and developing a much greater ethnic polarization.

A key objective of the establishment of an independent church was the reaffirmation and strengthening of Montenegrin sovereignty. However, the Serbian Orthodox Church saw this as an attempt by the Montenegrin government to take over church properties it rightly owned, with the Serbian community naturally rejecting the law. During the discussion on the bill in parliament, Andrija Mandić, leader of the Democratic Front (DF), now part of the ZBCG alliance, threatened to "unearth buried weapons", a reference to the massacres of Muslims that took place in the former Yugoslavia.  He urged Muslim lawmakers, whose support was crucial to maintaining a DPS majority in parliament, not to support the law, saying "if you come after our church, we will come after your homes".

The Muslim community in BiH has strongly protested against what it saw as a call for genocide.

This anti-Muslim sentiment is rooted in what American historian Michael Sells called "Christoslavism," a particular mixture of Orthodox Christianity and Southern Slavic nationalism that sees Slavic Muslims as traitors. In this expansionist nationalist ideology, Slavic Muslims are seen as apostates[3] of Christianity. Thus, A. Mandić's rhetoric, together with the official statements of the Serbian Orthodox Church, motivated and encouraged the Serb population, which took to the streets to demand the government to repeal the law.

Officially, the Serbian government opposed the law and pressured the DPS to cancel it, but unofficially, as Vesna Pešić, a Serbian human rights and anti-war activist, pointed out, both M.Đukanović and his Serbian counterpart, Aleksandar Vučić, took advantage on the tense environment. For M.Đukanović, his political gain was to strengthen Montenegro's position on Serbia by marginalizing the Serbian Orthodox Church. For A.Vučić, the ultimate goal is to recover (if possible) the Serb communities in Kosovo, BiH and Montenegro.

Thus, the Law on Religious Freedom was nothing more than an attempt by corrupt ethnic nationalist elites to stay in power and pursue their nationalist agendas, but it was also a major mistake by M.ukanović. The Serbian Orthodox Church and supporters of "Great Serbia" won this power contest, with priests using religion to mobilize the Serb population, using the notion of historical victimization of Serbs, and this mobilization of voters ultimately influenced the vote in favor of the Montenegrin opposition.

M.Đukanović not only lost, but also missed a valuable opportunity to create a truly civic identity in Montenegro. Turning to ethnic nationalism, he turned out not to be different from most leaders in the Western Balkans who, unfortunately, threw the region into an endless loop of nationalist rhetoric that helps accentuate the division on ethnic and religious criteria.

Promises and hopes … but also uncertainties

On September 1^st, Milo Đukanović acknowledged the electoral defeat of his political party, accusing Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and the Belgrade media of interfering in Montenegro's domestic politics, as well as alleged attempts to revive a "politics of Greater Serbia”. He said his party might have lost support because of dissatisfaction with some policies, but also because of manipulations in Belgrade and the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro.

Political parties which have a parliamentary majority and intend to form the new Podgorica government have confirmed that they will continue to work on the EU accession process, fight corruption, overcome polarization in society and the economic crisis, and work to change the law on religious communities. They also invited Bosnian and Albanian minority parties in Montenegro to participate in the formation of the new government. The leaders of the political parties that make up the new parliamentary majority in Podgorica made these commitments as part of an agreement on the key obligations of the new government, stressing that "the agreement signed on 9 September is a confirmation that the new democratic government will be pro-European, pro-Western and pro-Montenegrin ... There is no change in Montenegro's foreign policy, only its consolidation", as MNN leader, A. Bečić, emphasized.

URA leader D. Abazović said that European integration and the economy will be the key challenges facing the new authorities, stressing that the new government has the support of international organizations. "We face great economic and social challenges, many problems, an empty budget and problems of corruption and organized crime. The new government will pay the most attention to these issues", D. Abazović emphasized.

It has become very clear that, according to the agreement signed between the political parties that will hold the majority in the Podgorica Parliament, the new government will depoliticize key state institutions to ensure an uncompromising fight against organized crime and corruption, one of the stated goals being that the new government will not act revengefully, on a political or other basis.

However, ZBCG leader Z.Krivokapić said the new government would withdraw the highly contested law on religious freedom, which upset and alienated the large Serbian community and the Serbian Orthodox Church, as the current law calls into question property rights. The ZBCG leader stressed that "since parliament passed the law on freedom of religion in December 2019, tens of thousands of priests, believers and supporters of the Serbian Orthodox Church have protested in public, demanding its withdrawal".

Despite these promises, Serbian pro-government tabloids unanimously criticized the coalition that forms the new parliamentary majority, agreeing not to discuss changing Montenegro's national symbols, recognizing Kosovo or withdrawing the country from NATO.

Although the defeat of the DPS, the political party led by the current president, M.Đukanović, should have been a welcome development, experts from many quarters see the future government and the new parliamentary power as a source of great uncertainty.

Even if the new governing coalition in Podgorica is committed to supporting existing international treaties and European integration, it is not clear how this goal will be achieved. The URA leader insists on establishing an expert government and threatens to withdraw if the emerging coalition adopts a strong pro-Serbian position. All this could make the new governing coalition unstable and fragile and create a favorable space for M.Đukanović to attract smaller parties from the new coalition, such as the URA. This would either trigger the formation of a new coalition or lead to early elections.

Scenarios and conclusions

At the moment, despite the weaknesses, M.Đukanović may be an even better option, as another alternative would push Montenegro into the influence of both Serbia and Russia. As a result, it can be concluded that, in such a context, his participation and that of his political allies in government would ensure Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Such a development would be supported by the West, which could also put more pressure on M.Đukanović to engage in the process of anti-corruption reforms or, perhaps in another context of developments, even to resign.

Another possible scenario is for smaller parties not to join any of the coalitions, which could lead to a constitutional crisis or lead to new elections, with increasingly uncertain results.

Looking at the recent violence against the Muslim minority in Montenegro, it seems that the second scenario presented could destabilize Montenegro.

The new governing coalition will face the difficult task of rescuing a devastated country's economy, whose external debt is close to 85% of its annual GDP. As a result, the new government must engage in a series of tough structural economic, political, financial, legal and social reforms. It must resume the capacity building process and gradually transform state institutions into functional segments of the state. It must also initiate a healing process in a deeply divided society along ethnic and religious lines. Understanding this effort, as a general task, should be a guiding principle for the winning political parties in the last parliamentary election process.

Thus, the international community should pay attention to what is happening in this country, Montenegro being an important state for Russia thanks to its geographical position, with ports on the Adriatic Sea. The EU accession process needs to be accelerated, and NATO needs to ensure that various international actors with significant influence in the Western Balkans do not have access to sensitive NATO information.

Similarly, Brussels must warn Serbia – which is in the middle of accession negotiations with the EU – that it cannot keep on being Russia’s main base in the Balkans, nor it can continue its interference in the internal policy of Montenegro. After meetings moderated by the US and EU, at the beginning of this month, which seem to contribute to normalizing the ties and the negotiation process between Kosovo and Serbia, but have bothered Kremlin, the development of Montenegro’s relations with Serbia will be an important test to establish if the two states will keep their foreign policy objectives towards the West.