D.S.M. WEEKLY REPORT - Main Political and Military Developments (WEEK 23 of 2020)

English version by Mircea Mocanu

I. HUNGARY / CENTRAL EUROPE. Hungarian political positions regarding the Trianon Centennial.

On the backdrop of commemorating 100 years since the Treaty of Trianon[1] was signed, Hungarian authorities offered statements on Hungary’s policy regarding the Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries. Budapest announced its intention to define nation as a subject of international laws, requesting international recognition for “the right to national identity”. Before the event, Budapest had taken measures to patch its relations with the neighbors: Hungarian foreign minister had meetings with his counterparts in Romania, Ukraine, and Slovakia. However, Viktor Orbán regime’s captured the moment and these latest statements reflect its determination to continue a policy of extracting what it deems necessary to be granted to minorities, depending on the way that country is perceived (domestic and foreign vulnerabilities). Thus, Slovakia was presented a being the most tolerant regarding Budapest requests, although Bratislava, with strong economy and strong position within Visegrad Group, will grant double citizenship tops. Meanwhile, Romania and Ukraine were treated quite differently: Romania should accept much more – autonomy on ethnic grounds, perhaps because it is perceived in Budapest as being vulnerable at home, and Ukraine, which is too strong by a nationalism as tough as the Hungarian nationalism, but is vulnerable abroad, facing Russia, and this way Budapest hits precisely where Kyiv hurts the most – its relations with NATO and the EU.

Trianon Treaty Centennial was marked by several actions in Hungary and neighboring countries, where ethnic Hungarians expressed their feelings regarding this historic event and their desires for Hungarian minorities outside Hungary. The main political event was the Declaration issued by Hungary’s Parliament, where it opens the work of raising the concept of nation to international law level. The wording was that, “in Central and Eastern Europe (the Carpathian Basin), should all national states recognize the right to national identity for all their citizens and communities, allowing the preservation of mother tongue, culture and hearth, that would make a long-term guarantee for security, political and social stability, economic development and prosperity”. Basically, this syntagma is consistent with Romania’s European position regarding minorities. However, this language includes a veiled threat and it squeezes a hint to territorial autonomy on ethnic bases. The Declaration calls “on the parliaments and governments of Hungary’s neighbouring countries, European Union institutions and the United Nations to declare the right to one’s national identity a universal human right”. It also requests these countries to include in their Constitutions wording on the “legal status of constituent nation” for Hungarian minorities in respective countries. These requests raise a problem: Viktor Orbán regime attempts to internationalize its nationalist policy by pressing neighboring countries. Although supported by extreme positions which Viktor Orbán regime intensely promotes in the Hungarian minorities, this approach has little chances to succeed, but they will cause tensions. Viktor Orbán is probably fishing for a nation in the area, in a vulnerable position, that would respond to this call / request. Statements by Hungarian officials clear Hungary’s position[2]. Hungarian Parliament Speaker László Kövér declared that “the right to national identity is universal” and should be recognized worldwide, as this right “serves the future of Hungarian nation, that of neighboring nations, and Europe at the same time”. He presented Trianon’s current and future impact, as Hungarians living beyond the border are engaged “in a bitter struggle to survive, preserve their mother tongue, culture, to feel at home in their place of birth”. Kövér noticed three historical lessons for Hungarians: 1) threats against the very existence of Hungarian nation must not be underestimated, they have not subsided; 2) there could always be a “large price to pay if we don’t pay attention to what’s going on in the world around us”; 3) a country cannot promote its interests in the world without allies. He insisted that, in Europe, nationalism should be associated with Christianity, as a work of combining the “revanchist nationalism” with “anti-liberalism Christianity”, which describes Viktor Orbán regime’s ideology, essentially anti-democratic, since it is seen in Europe as a simple “breach of rule of law state”.

The political strategy of raising national identity to the rank of international law notion has no chance to succeed, but Viktor Orbán regime does not aim at success, but only at using this initiative as a pressure tool on neighboring countries. Romania, as the other nations neighboring Hungary, should probably not engage in such useless debates, and simply continue Romanian policy (as written in the Union Hall in Alba Iulia) and European too, for our ethnic Hungarian countrymen, and thus make them feel at home. We have the national conscience allowing that, since we have been ourselves, as a nation, subjected to denationalization efforts (including by Budapest), and even worse, subjected to ethnic and cultural genocide. Therefore, the Romanian - Hungarian domestic dialogue is the solution for our future together.

Although threatening, Budapest policy is more dangerous for Hungary than it is for Romania, because Bucharest is engaged on a European path securing optimal development conditions for everybody, Hungarian minority included, while nationalist illiberalism pseudo-ideology is a path leading nowhere else but to domestic and international tensions. It is important for us, Romanians, and ethnic Hungarians in Romania, not to be caught in such endeavor. Viktor Orbán’s problem, as well as the problem of those he instruments, is that Romania, who will always be understanding with its ethnic Hungarians, already passed the peak of its vulnerabilities and will solve at home the dialogue with its minority by choosing the European model, with a solid principled basis and not engaging in Viktor Orbán games[3].

In Romania, our priorities range domestic problems from political stabilization to productive middle-class social consolidation and economic development in European circumstances. For us, solving these problems will secure the framework where the majority – minority dialogue finds optimal solutions. Hungarian minority should probably pay more attention to avoid being used, both because everything it wants will get through domestic dialogue in Romania, and because the moment is not far when a new danger appears: Hungarian minority in Romania might become the only force maintaining the Viktor Orbán anti-democratic regime in power, against the will of Hungarians in Hungary.

II. RUSSIA. New Nuclear Strategy.

Russia’s new nuclear strategy arrives at the opportune moment to support the Kremlin’s efforts to extend the New START agreement, and it brings clarifications, but also certain concerns. The document presents the situations where Moscow would resort to its nuclear weapons. In addition to the previous known situations (in response to nuclear attack and to a conventional attack threatening the Russian state existence), other two situations when Russia would use nuclear weapons appear, and both are dangerous by the uncertainty they include: Russia resorts first to nuclear weapons when credible intelligence is available that a nuclear attack on Russia was initiated, as well as in the situation when a conventional attack has affected Russian governmental and nuclear critical infrastructure. The strategy also presents the threats perceived on Russia. It is important that such document was published, as such level of transparency brings along a minimal level of trust.

On June 6th, in the context of tensions with NATO, respectively the United States, President Vladimir Putin signed the document called “The Foundation of Russian Federation State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence”. Russia maintains the general notion on the “defensive nature” of its use of nuclear weapons, which are meant to secure state sovereignty against potential adversaries. Consistent with Russia’s military doctrine, four situations are presented for cases when nuclear weapons would be used, whence two are new and mention the first use of nuclear weapons by Russia, not in response to a nuclear attack or a conventional attack threatening its existence. The two known situations feature the response to a well defined situation: 1) response to the situation where an enemy uses nuclear weapons or other mass destruction weapons against Russia or its allies; 2) the situation of a conventional conflict “threatening the very existence of the Russian state”. The two new situations stipulated in the new document state are: 3) the government has credible intelligence that an attack with ballistic missiles is imminent: “trustworthy information received about ballistic missile launches to attack Russian Federation territory and / or its allies”; 4) in case “the impact of enemy action on governmental and military critical infrastructure leads to their annihilation and cause an impossibility of nuclear forces to generate a nuclear response”.   

Stated threats against Russia are: 1) if a potential enemy deploys general purpose group of forces, including nuclear armament launching systems (the American nuclear weapons deployed in Europe fit here), in vicinity of Russia or its allies, as well as in adjacent maritime areas; 2) if countries considered potential enemies to Russia deploy means and missile defense systems (the BDM systems deployed at Deveselu / Romania, and Aegis BDM warships fit here), short and mid-range cruise and ballistic missiles (NATO’s future response to Russia’s INF breach), conventional precision armament and hypersonic weapons, assault drones and directed energy systems; 3) if those potential enemies deploy missile defense and strike missile systems in the outer space; 4) if those countries build a capacity / readiness to utilize against the Russian Federation and its allies nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, as well as launching installations or systems for delivery to target, or technology and equipment for their production; 6) if those countries deploy nuclear weapons and delivery / launching systems for that armament on the territory of non-nuclear nations.

Moscow’s new nuclear strategy seeks to compensate Russia’s vulnerabilities in conventional forces, but especially in technology, by threatening with nuclear arms utilization in the situation a conventional conflict goes the wrong way for Russia. The escalation of a conventional conflict has been practiced since a long time, in situations not connected with any threat against the very existence of Russia as a state: there is no desperate situation when exercising nuclear strikes against Warsaw (as Russia did in a major military exercise scenario). After the aggression against Ukraine, Russia was seen calculating its aggressions with conventional forces against countries with smaller military capacities and not belonging to any alliance. Moscow did that by threatening with its nuclear weapons, aiming to deter the intervention by third party powers in support of targeted countries. Now, two new situations appear, and they reflect that, beyond its propaganda with the use of niche high-tech weapons, the Kremlin feels vulnerable facing the West and promotes the utilization of nuclear weapons in these new situations. This approach might lead to an increase in deterrence, but it also brings dangerous uncertainties regarding the moment of that utilization: 1) how accurate is Russia’s capacity of detecting, with a high level of confidence, the moment of launching an attack on its territory; in fact, how big is the danger of “detecting a false attack” and launch a counter-strike based on that information; 2) how clear can a moment be defined as being the instance when a conventional attack damaged the Russian governmental and nuclear critical infrastructure to the level where Russian defense cannot provide a nuclear response? Moscow is playing with fire and this is not good for any of the two sides[4]. Considering that Russian early warning system does not enjoy a reliability reputation, being based on ground based OTH radars, which can yield errors, and on a warning satellite system considered incomplete.  Aiming to calm down its adversaries, Russia announced the launch of a new satellite, and the number of satellites now assures the required performance of its warning satellite system.   

The document responds to a strategic and a tactical need. The strategic need is to accurately define Russia’s nuclear policy, and the document publicly presents these situations, thus bringing the necessary deterrence, but also the concerns caused by uncertainties regarding the new situation of nuclear weapon utilization. The tactical need is to convince the United States to extend the New START Treaty, considering that it expires in February 2021, and Trump Administration insists on renegotiating the agreement and include China (who refuses any negotiation). The problem links to the new issues: the demise of INF, after Russia breached it by deploying a couple of SSC-8 missile regiments, and NATO’s response to this escalation; the possible redeployment of American tactical nuclear weapons closer to Russia’s borders (from Germany to Poland). Anyway, Romania was targeted by Russian nuclear arsenal since Bucharest accepted the deployment of the missile defense shield installations. That was a calculated risk taken in cooperation with Romania’s strategic ally, in service of national security against the main threat against us, especially now, when the INF was breached and ended.

In this context, let us mention the briefing held by the head of Operations in Russian General Staff, General Sergey Rudskoy, who presented the increasing threat from NATO, considering the flights of American B-1 strategic bombers and the recent presence of American naval group in the Barents Sea. He announced that Russia would conduct its exercises far from NATO borders, and that Russia is ready for talks on flights with transponders open, to avoid incidents. Let us also mention that Russian aircraft always fly with transponders off, therefore they cannot be identified by civilian flight control systems, and that only during the latest American flights there was “reciprocity” from American B-1 aircraft. There is an incident prevention agreement between the two countries, but Russian aviation makes provocations whenever U.S. surveillance aircraft bother Russian military by collecting intelligence (such as the incident with P8 Poseidon aircraft, which was monitoring the preparation of Russian aircraft flights in Syria or Libya). Regarding the B-1 bomber flight over the Black Sea, one can notice, even in the Russian presentation, that American flights unfolded along the median axis between occupied Crimea and Turkey, with a very short sequence of turning into the Simferopol flight control area. For comparison, Russian Tu-22M3 bombers neared Romania’s air space. Let us hope that, as announced, the large-scale Russian exercise in the South will unfold far from NATO borders. Anyway, Russia is currently conducting naval exercises in the Black Sea and anti-aircraft exercises in Russia’s Joint Strategic Command West. In the briefing, the letter sent by Sergey Lavrov to NATO Secretary General was also mentioned, as it was referring to a post-INF moratorium, and remained without an answer. Of course, NATO focuses on ways to respond to Russian already deployed SSC-8 regiments, not on accepting the present situation by a moratorium, while Russia already threatens the whole Europe with these cruise missiles.

Between victimization and threats, Russia seeks to establish a strategic balance on its terms, but it will be difficult to see NATO and the U.S. accept the unbalanced strategic situation created by the Kremlin in Europe, although the Alliance has its own domestic problems, with differences between important allies. Anyway, these issues do not affect Romania, because we have trustful relations with all our western allies. The situation will get stressed after NATO response to Russia’s deployment of SSC-8 and the demise of New START (although the United States will likely extend this treaty for a limited period).

III. UNITED STATES / GERMANY. The United States withdraws part of its troops on Germany.

Rumors that the Pentagon will reduce its troops in Germany sparked negative political reactions in this country. Although, unofficially, Washington has let know that a reduction is a gradual military process, the political perception in Germany is that a reduction is a sudden decision by President Trump, on the backdrop of multiple tensions with Germany (on economic, political, and military issues). The readiness announced by Warsaw to host American troops withdrawn from Germany does not help the situation. It is probably a sudden decision, but consequences are deep, and they reflect current differences between the great power in the West and Europe’s “reluctant hegemon”. Anyway, beyond a spike of concerns, trends were visible: From a military point of view, the American military disposition advance towards the East, and the slow and reluctant increase in Germany’s military role; From a political point of view, differences between Berlin and Washington, although old, will not lead to a trans-Atlantic split. 

The United States will withdraw 9,500 soldiers from Germany. So, American troops, now 34,000 GIs deployed in 21 military bases, would be reduced to 25,000. Surprised by this decision, the Germans ask themselves what will Germany’s strategic situation be, respectively Europe’s situation, if the United States withdraws its troops from Germany? German reactions were tough, with German Christian-Democrat deputies criticizing President Trump’s decision. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas eloquently commented the relation between the U.S. and Germany: “We are close partners in the transatlantic alliance. But: It is complicated ”. He insisted on positive elements and on the fact that reduction information is not official yet: “Should it come to the withdrawal of part of the U.S. troops, we take note of this. We appreciate the cooperation with the U.S. forces that has developed over decades. It is in the interests of both our countries”. The American side unofficially communicated that the withdrawal process is planned and Gen. Mark Milley has been working for months on this plan. They also stated that the decision has nothing to do with German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s refusal to participate in the G7 reunion organized by President Trump (and with the rejection, along other G7 leaders, to invite Vladimir Putin to that event). Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Moraviecki expressed his hope that part of the American soldiers withdrawn from Germany would be deployed to Poland, and he motivated that the real danger is at the eastern border, adding that deploying American troops to the east would lead to a consolidation of security for the whole Europe. 

At the same time, the situation is both more complicated and simpler than it looks. Unfortunately, the decision has been taken, perhaps, by President Trump, also as a political response to the German chancellor refusal, but, however, it fits a global plan of American troop reduction, and a European redeployment to the East (which was expected since the signing of Polish American agreement). At the same time, American-German relations are profound, as Germany will be not only the hub of American presence in Europe, but also America’s most important military ally in Europe, and the key of the trans-Atlantic relation (especially after the United Kingdom left the EU). Beyond President Trump’s mercantile perception (you ask us to protect you from Russia, yet you make gas business with Russia, at our expense), there is an element of continuity: for a long time, the U.S. has asked Germany to increase its defense budget, and Berlin, although made some efforts, failed to comply significantly. President Trump is not happy with EU’s, respectively Germany’s economic power, and eyes the trade balance deficit. Not even the calculated Angela Merkel manages to temperate this approach, and the personal relations between the two keep going south. However, in economy, things are going to settle on the long run, by a future EU – U.S. agreement, with Germany in the driving seat for the EU in the negotiations.

In politics, there are high tensions now, but they do not impact on the principled basis of bilateral relations. President Trump never stopped shocking the Europeans, spearheaded by Germany, with his “America first” policy, but also some Europeans, spearheaded not by Germany but by France, never stopped advocating multilateralism and a European defense between the United States and Russia, as if Europe were threatened by… America, whose troops defend it. Nevertheless, Germany was firm in sustaining that Europe cannot be defended without the United States. Problems appeared with divergent decisions in almost all current dossiers, from Iran to Syria. However, both politically and economically, the two, U.S. and Germany (leading the EU) are fundamentally linked, being the “Free World” and the “Free Market”, regardless various approaches; the political approach towards authoritarian regimes is shared (although President Trump kind of likes dictators, whom he still strikes though, when needed: nobody created bigger strategic or economic problems to Putin than… Trump). The same, talking about economic threat, China breaches the rules both with the United States, and with Germany / EU. But the difference is in approach, more diplomatic in case of Germany. In security, Russian threat is common and the response is unitary, although differences in approach are visible (see German reaction after the U.S. quit the Open Sky treaty, and we will see difference in post-INF response, which gives Moscow the illusion it might remain in advantage, although it is not the case).

As the Polish prime minister rather hastily showed, like other eastern Europeans as well, they want to be occupied by American troops too, not only Germany. It would be a relatively small military step, which might come true only partly, as the American military infrastructure and the deep American – German cooperation does not allow massive quick changes. Germany will start to think about a unitary national position, because, while the Christian-Democrats are worried that the U.S. leaves, the Social-Democrats are upset that Germany is left with… nuclear bombs on German territory. Perhaps, American political-military decision-makers are already working to water down the president’s decision, both for military and political reasons. Therefore, although there is a political quarrel on a military problem, it is an issue without a long-term impact – the Americans do not leave Europe, and the Germans do not see Europe without Americans either. But, for the moment, angers and mutual dislike will surface, which provides an opportunity for adversaries to build illusions.

IV. GERMANY / UKRAINE. Ukrainian foreign minister visits Berlin.

On June 2^nd, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba visited Berlin. This was an opportunity for new guarantees provided by Germany that Ukraine will receive Berlin support and that negotiations initiated with Russia will not lean against Kyiv, the established red lines will be respected. The situation in Donbass was discussed, as well as Russian proposals communicated by Dmitry Kozak. Ukraine also received Germany’s support for getting closer to NATO and the EU. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and his Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba announced the decision to accelerate the implementation of agreements taken during the latest Normandy format meeting, in Paris. Kuleba specified that Ukraine wants peace in Donbass, but this peace should not lead to crossing the red lines which are “Ukraine’s national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Regarding the situation on the ground, Maas mentioned the need for cease-fire, for opening new contact line crossing points, and the importance of continued demining operations. Kuleba proposed granting access to the International Red Cross in Crimea, where Russia conducts a policy of “persecution against the Tartars”. Most important, Germany offered assurances it would continue to support Ukraine in the process of its closer relations with NATO and the EU.

Speeding up the implementation of recent Paris agreements is difficult to achieve in conditions where disagreements in the Minsk Trilateral Working Group reflected in the degradation of contact line situation. Pragmatic Germany tries to implement certain measures at the contact line, although cease-fire is a political decision to be taken in Moscow. Basically, Kyiv specified the red lines, meaning it would not allow Moscow to dent its sovereignty, while implementing a peace plan, any peace plan, from Kozak options to “Steinmeier roadmap”. Meanwhile, for Moscow, a red line means precisely the goal of limiting Ukraine’s sovereignty. Perhaps, Berlin requested Kyiv to unilaterally implement measures continuing the Paris accord and based on the Minsk Agreement. This should happen both at the contact line, and, especially, in Minsk, where Kyiv seriously hit Moscow’s separatists (by proposing to include Ukrainian refugees who fled Donbass as representatives of Donbass civil society in the delegation for Minsk negotiations. Kyiv also presented the separatist leaders who claim these positions in the delegation as Russian citizens (with documents) and Moscow’s instruments (which they are, but the Europeans forcibly accepted, in Minsk, when the agreements were signed, the Russian narrative that those leaders are Russian speaking Ukrainians from Donbass persecuted by Kyiv, and have no connection with Russia).

VI. Developments to track this Week 24 of 2020.

► KOSOVO. The new government was voted without problems in the parliament, but divergences between Hashim Thaci and Albin Kurti remain (the latter persists in requesting elections). The new prime minister Avdullah Hoti unconditionally lifted the tariffs on Serbian products or merchandise imported through Serbia, which was welcomed by Belgrade. Thus, the path to resuming negotiations was opened, but… what path, as divergences between the United States and Germany also persist. Therefore, Hashim Thaci announced he would not meet the EU representative for Kosovo, Miroslav Lajčak. Berlin responded through Brussels, which reminded that mediation between Serbia and Kosovo is to be conducted by the EU. We must wait for American-German negotiations before witnessing Kosovar-Serbian negotiations. Anyway, the path is open, after an artificial break created by Priština’s tariffs.

► UNITED STATES. Although with lower violence, protests in the United States soar, and they show that the U.S. is divided, and the left – right gap cannot be mended in the center. President Trump approaches the issue in force, being concerned with his electoral basis. In fact, in the United States, the election campaign began, and it is conducted with all available means, since President Trump’s mandate is at stake, as well as the future of the United States as a stable democracy. Protests are just the tip of the iceberg. Donald Trump will seek to steer the focus on economy, where he thinks he can bounce back quickly the in his advantage, and on the dispute with China, which is at economic war with. However, the American society might look towards the social issues instead. President Trump should pay attention, in conditions where the “adults in the room”, the generals who used to be by his side, openly raise questions regarding respecting the Constitution and president morality.   

► REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. President Igor Dodon will visit Russia (officially for renegotiating the agreement, in fact, to get new orders), and Prime Minister Ion Chicu must negotiate with the Westerners, hoping to get some money from the EU. The Europeans sent him eight clear prerequisites for receiving some money, and the power has no alternative but to comply. Thus, after Chicu’s meeting with U.S. and EU ambassadors, the government announced that the NGO bill would be passed (the power wanted to limit the NGO financial independence, but allow certain charities, such as Dodon’s wife’s, to involve in politics, respectively to bribe population during the election campaign). From a political point of view, it this a well-known vaudeville, while, from a social point of view, the drama is significant, and Coronavirus crisis effects pile up on top of already big current economic problems. And this happens both directly (in the Republic of Moldova / RM, the pandemic continues), and indirectly (reduced revenues). Regardless the power behavior in Chişinău, Bucharest should probably financially support the RM population, either directly or through the EU.